In this study, we develop a search-and-matching monetary growth model to analyze the e¤ects of in ‡ation on economic growth and social welfare by introducing endogenous economic growth via capital externality into a two-sector search-and-matching model. We …nd that the channel through which in ‡ation a¤ects economic growth in the search-and-matching model is di¤erent from the traditional cash-in-advance model. To facilitate the calibration, we obtain an empirical estimate of the e¤ects of in ‡ation on economic growth using panel regressions. In the simulation analysis, we quantitatively evaluate the welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation in the search-and-matching endogenous growth model and compare it to a search-and-matching exogenous growth model. We …nd that the welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation is nonlinear in the endogenous growth model whereas it is linear in the exogenous growth model. Furthermore, we …nd that the welfare cost of in ‡ation under endogenous growth is up to four times as large as the welfare cost of in ‡ation under exogenous growth.
Introduction
In this study, we analyze the e¤ects of in ‡ation and monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare. Although this important issue in monetary economics has received much attention and careful analysis in previous studies, our analysis provides novel elements and results. To highlight the novelty of this study, it is helpful to …rst discuss two related branches of literature in monetary economics. First, this study relates to the search-andmatching literature on money and capital formation; see for example, Shi (1999) , Menner (2006) , Williamson and Wright (2010) , Aruoba et al. (2011) , Bencivenga and Camera (2011) and Waller (2011) . This branch of literature analyzes the relationship between money and capital formation in a search-theoretic framework without considering economic growth as an endogenous process. Second, this study also relates to the branch of literature on in ‡ation and economic growth; see for example, Wang and Yip (1992) , Gomme (1993) , Dotsey and Ireland (1996) , Mino (1997) and more recently, Mino (2003, 2007) and Lai and Chin (2010) . 1 This branch of literature analyzes the growth and welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation by modeling money demand based on the classical approach, such as a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint, money in utility and transaction costs, without considering a search-and-matching framework. In this study, we attempt to provide a bridge between these two branches of literature by analyzing the growth and welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation in a search-and-matching monetary growth model. In summary, we introduce endogenous economic growth via capital externality as in Romer (1986) into a two-sector search-and-matching model based on Lagos and Wright (2005) , Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011) . 2 In this search-and-matching monetary growth model, we obtain the following results that have novel implications to the two abovementioned branches of literature.
In a canonical monetary growth model with a CIA constraint on consumption, in ‡ation a¤ects economic growth via the consumption-leisure tradeo¤. In other words, in the case of inelastic labor supply, in ‡ation has no e¤ect on economic growth in the CIA model. In contrast, in the search-and-matching monetary growth model, the growth e¤ects of in ‡ation operate through a consumption e¤ect in the decentralized market. Intuitively, a higher in ‡a-tion rate increases the cost of holding money and reduces consumption in the decentralized market that requires the use of money for transactions. As a result of lower consumption in the decentralized market, capital demand decreases causing a reduction in capital accumulation and economic growth regardless of whether or not labor supply is elastic.
To facilitate the calibration of the model, we use cross-country panel data to provide an empirical estimation and …nd that in ‡ation has a statistically signi…cant negative direct e¤ect on economic growth as well as a statistically signi…cant negative indirect e¤ect on economic growth through the reduction of capital investment. Then, we use these estimates as an empirical moment to calibrate the model in order to quantitatively evaluate the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation. We compare the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation under the search-and-matching endogenous growth model to those from a search-and-matching exogenous growth model 1 There is also a sub-branch of this literature that analyzes the relationship between in ‡ation and innovation-driven economic growth; see for example, Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) , Chu and Lai (2013) and Chu and Cozzi (2013) . 2 A recent study by Chiu et al. (2011) also provides an interesting analysis on the e¤ects of …nancial and search frictions on economic growth, but they do not consider money and in ‡ation. similar to Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011) in order to highlight the importance of modelling economic growth as an endogenous process. We …nd that the welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation is nonlinear in the endogenous growth model, 3 whereas it is linear in the exogenous growth model. We discuss the intuition of this result in the main text. 4 Interestingly, we also …nd that the welfare cost of in ‡ation under endogenous growth is up to four times as large as the welfare cost of in ‡ation under exogenous growth partly because reducing in ‡ation increases the long-run growth rate in the endogenous growth model but not in the exogenous growth model. Furthermore, given that the welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation is nonlinear in the endogenous growth model, the di¤erence in the welfare costs of in ‡ation across the two models is increasing in the size of the change in the money growth rate.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the search-and-matching monetary growth model. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of in ‡ation on economic growth and social welfare. In Section 4, we calibrate the model to provide a quantitative analysis. The …nal section concludes.
A search-and-matching monetary growth model
The two-sector search-and-matching model is based on Lagos and Wright (2005 
Households
There is a unit measure of identical and in…nitely-lived households in discrete time. In each period, households engage in economic activities …rst in the decentralized market (hereafter DM) and then in the centralized market (hereafter CM). The DM and the CM are distinguished as follows. In each period t, households …rst enter the DM where they consume or produce special goods q t . In this market, each meeting is random and anonymous so that money becomes essential. 5 Once the round of DM trade is completed, households proceed to the CM where they consume and produce general goods as in standard growth models. Following the common approach in the literature, we assume that there is no discounting between the DM and the CM within each period, and the discount factor between any two consecutive periods is 2 (0; 1). In what follows, we …rst discuss households' optimization in the CM.
Households' optimization in the CM
In the CM, households have an instantaneous utility function u t = B ln x t Ah t , which is increasing in the consumption of general goods x t and decreasing in the supply of labor h t . The parameters A > 0 and B > 0 determine respectively the disutility of labor supply and the importance of consumption. 6 Let W (m t ; k t ) and V (m t ; k t ) denote the period-t value functions for households in the CM and the DM respectively. m t is the nominal money balance and k t is the capital stock owned by households in period t. The maximization problem of households in the CM can be expressed as
subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by
p t is the price of general goods. w t is the real wage rate (denominated in units of general goods). r t is the rental price of capital. The parameter 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of capital. t is a real lump-sum transfer from the government. From standard optimization, the optimality condition for consumption in the CM is
Equation (3) implies that all households consume the same amount of general goods x t in the CM regardless of their holdings of capital and money. This useful property results from the quasi-linear utility function, which is a standard simplifying assumption in this branch of model to eliminate any dispersion in money holdings that arises from trades in the DM. 7 The standard intertemporal optimality conditions for the accumulation of capital and money are respectively Equations (3) to (5) imply that all households enter the DM in the next period with the same holdings of capital and money. In addition, the familiar envelope conditions are
Households' optimization in the DM
In the DM, a household either becomes (a) a buyer, (b) a seller or (c) a nontrader. The probability of becoming a buyer is 2 (0; 0:5), and the probability of becoming a seller is also 2 (0; 0:5). The probability of becoming a nontrader is 1 2 > 0. As ! 0, monetary policy would have no e¤ects on economic growth and social welfare. This tasteand-technology-shock speci…cation shows a random matching technology that buyers meet with sellers and is a standard feature of the Lagos-Wright model. 8 As a result of this tasteand-technology shock, the value of entering the DM is
where V b (:) and V s (:) are the values of being a buyer and a seller respectively. To analyze V b (:) and V s (:), we consider the following functional forms for the buyers' preference and the sellers' production technology. In the DM, each buyer's utility ln q b t is increasing and concave in the consumption of special goods. Each seller produces special goods q s t by combining her capital k t and e¤ort e t subject to the following Cobb-Douglas production function. q
where z t denotes aggregate technology. To achieve endogenous growth, we will follow Romer (1986) to assume that capital has a positive externality e¤ect on aggregate technology such that z t = k t , where k t is the aggregate holding of capital in the economy. 9 The parameter 2 (0; 1) determines capital share. To ensure constant returns to scale, we will impose = 1 on labor share; however, it would be useful for us to …rst present the analysis with in order to isolate the e¤ects of capital and labor shares.
Rewriting equation (9), we can express the utility cost of production as e q s t
Buyers purchase special goods q 10 Given these terms of trade, the values of being a buyer and a seller are respectively
Di¤erentiating (11) and (12) and substituting them into (8), we can obtain the following envelope condition for m t .
where
. Similarly, we can obtain the following envelope condition for k t :
where (6). To solve the marginal value of holding money (13) and capital (14), we consider a competitive equilibrium with price taking as in Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011) . 12 Under price taking, once buyers and sellers are matched, they both act as price takers. Given the price e p t of special goods, buyers choose q
subject to the budget constraint d
In the DM, buyers spend all their money, 13 so that the money constraint implies that
11 Adding a disutility parameter to the supply of e¤ort in the DM would not change our qualitative and quantitative results. Therefore, we follow Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011) to normalize this parameter to unity. 12 In addition to the competitive equilibrium with price taking, Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011) also consider bargaining between buyers and sellers to determine the terms of trade. In this study, we focus on the competitive equilibrium with price taking because of economic growth. In the case of generalized Nash bargaining as in Aruoba et al. (2011) or proportional bargaining as in Waller (2011) , the bargaining condition is incompatible with balanced growth because the buyers' utility, which determines their surplus, is increasing overtime due to economic growth whereas the sellers' disutility of e¤ort is stationary on a balanced growth path. In Appendix A, we demonstrate this problem under proportional bargaining and show that only a special case in which buyers gain all surplus is consistent with balanced growth; however, under this special case, in ‡ation has no e¤ect on economic growth because sellers obtain zero surplus in the DM. 13 See Appendix B for a proof. Intuitively, due to the opportunity cost of holding money and the possibility of not being a buyer in the DM, households do not carry a su¢cient amount of money to the DM. Therefore, if a household turns out to be a buyer in the DM, it would be optimal to spend all the money on q As for sellers' maximization problem in the DM, it is given by
Sellers' optimal supplies of special goods can be obtained from the following condition.
where the second equality of (19) makes use of (7) and (10).
Using (17) and (19) (13) and (14) are zero. Substituting these conditions, q b t = q s t = q t and (19) into (13) and (14), we can derive the following conditions.
Intuitively, (20) states that the marginal bene…t of holding money is the sum of the marginal utility from being able to consume special goods with probability (i.e., the household becomes a buyer in the DM) and the marginal utility from spending the money, which is also a valuable asset in the CM, on general goods with probability 1 (i.e., the household does not become a buyer in the DM). Equation (21) states that the marginal bene…t of holding capital is the sum of the marginal utility from spending the capital return 1 + r t on general goods in the CM and the expected marginal utility from having to exert less e¤ort (recall that e 2 < 0) in producing special goods in the DM with probability (i.e., the household becomes a seller in the DM). 14 
Firms in the CM
General goods are produced by using capital k t and production labor h t with the following Cobb-Douglas production function.
Monetary authority
Let t = (m t+1 m t )=m t denote the growth rate of money supply that is exogenously set by the monetary authority. Given the de…nition of real money balance m t =p t (denominated in units of general goods), its evolution can then be expressed as
where t is the in ‡ation rate that is endogenous and determines the cost of holding money. In each period, the monetary authority issues money to …nance a lump-sum transfer that has a real value of t = (m t+1 m t )=p t = t m t =p t .
Competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations fh t ; x t ; y x;t ; q t ; d t ; m t+1 ; k t+1 g 1 t=0 , a sequence of prices fw t ; r t ; p t ; e p t ; t g 1 t=0 and a sequence of policies f t ; t g 1 t=0 . Also, in each period, the following conditions hold.
In the CM, households choose fh t ; x t ; m t+1 ; k t+1 g to maximize (1) subject to (2) taking fw t ; r t ; p t ; t g as given;
In the DM, buyers and sellers choose fq t ; d t g to maximize utility taking fe p t g as given;
Competitive …rms in the CM produce fy x;t g to maximize pro…t taking fw t ; r t g as given;
The real value of aggregate consumption includes consumption in the CM and the DM such that c t (p t x t + e p t q t )=p t ;
The real value of aggregate output includes output in the CM and the DM such that y t (p t y x;t + e p t q t )=p t ;
The capital stock accumulates through investment from general goods such that k t+1 = y x;t x t + (1 )k t ;
The monetary authority balances its budget such that t = t m t =p t .
Balanced growth path
In this subsection, we consider the dynamic properties of the model. Given that the monetary authority sets a stationary growth rate of money supply (i.e., t = for all t), Proposition 1 shows that the economy jumps to a unique and locally stable balanced growth path. The proof is relegated to Appendix C. Given this balanced growth behavior of the model, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on the balanced growth path in the next section.
Proposition 1 Given a stationary sequence of monetary policy (i.e., t = for all t), the economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced growth path.
Growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on the balanced growth path along which the supply of labor is stationary. Given the equilibrium condition k t = k t , variables, such as output, consumption, capital and real money balance, exhibit a common growth rate g. Using (4), (10) and (21), we obtain
where r = h from (23) . The variables f c x=k and f d q=k denote the consumptioncapital ratios in the CM and the DM respectively.
We …rst make use of (5), (10), (19), (20) and (25) to derive the steady-state consumptioncapital ratio in the DM. We obtain
15 Equation (27) shows that the consumption-capital ratio in the DM is decreasing in the growth rate of money supply, and this result can be shown as follows.
Intuitively, a higher money growth rate increases in ‡ation, which in turn increases the cost of consumption in the DM, where money is needed for transactions.
As for the steady-state consumption-capital ratio in the CM, we make use of (23), (24) , (26) and the capital-accumulation equation k t+1 = y x;t x t + (1 )k t to derive
where aggregate labor h is still an endogenous variable and can be determined with the following condition.
which uses (3) and (24) . We use (30) to derive
As for the derivative of h, we substitute (27) and (30) into (29) and then take the di¤erentials of h with respect to to obtain 15 It can be shown that as ! 1, the nominal interest rate approaches the lower bound of zero. Here the nominal interest rate refers to the nominal rate of return on a conventional interest-bearing bond that pays interests in the CM (but not in the DM) of each period.
Substituting (32) into (31) shows that @f c =@ > 0. In summary, a higher money growth rate induces households to increase leisure and shift consumption from the DM to the CM.
Substituting (29) into (26), we obtain
From (33), it is easy to see that the growth rate g is decreasing in because @h=@ < 0 and @f d =@ < 0. Intuitively, in ‡ation a¤ects consumption in the DM, which in turn a¤ects capital accumulation via two channels. The …rst channel is the consumption-capital ratio f d in the DM. Intuitively, a higher in ‡ation increases the cost of holding money, thereby reducing the real money balance held by households and the value of goods traded in the DM. As a result, capital demand is depressed reducing the growth rate. The second channel is endogenous labor supply, which is standard in traditional monetary growth models. Intuitively, a decrease in labor supply reduces the marginal product of capital thereby reducing capital accumulation and economic growth. To separate the consumption and labor-supply e¤ects, we consider the limiting case ! 0.
where we have used f (27) . Therefore, even when the search-and-matching monetary growth model approaches the case with inelastic labor supply, in ‡ation continues to have a detrimental e¤ect on economic growth via the consumptioncapital ratio in the DM. This result stands in stark contrast to the canonical endogenous growth model with a CIA constraint on consumption, in which in ‡ation has no e¤ect on economic growth under inelastic labor supply. Before we proceed to analyze the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation, it would be helpful to brie ‡y present the equilibrium allocations under a special case of complete capital depreciation (i.e., = 1). In this case, the DM consumption-capital ratio f d in (27) remains unchanged; however, aggregate labor h in (30) nicely simpli…es to
which is increasing in because 1 + > 0. Given (30a), we can simply express the CM consumption-capital ratio as f c = B =(Ah 1 ), which is decreasing in . Finally, the growth rate g in (33) simpli…es to 16 In the previous version of this study, we provide an example of this model; see Chu et al. (2012) .
which is increasing in . Intuitively, as the matching probability increases, households have more incentives to accumulate capital, which in turn increases the equilibrium growth rate. Next, we examine the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy under the general case of incomplete capital depreciation (i.e., 2 (0; 1)). In this two-sector search model, households engage in two types of economic activities in the DM and the CM every period. On the balanced growth path, the lifetime utility U of households that includes the utility from the CM and the expected utility from the DM can be expressed as
Substituting q 0 = f d k 0 and x 0 = f c k 0 into (35) and then normalizing initial k 0 to unity, (35) simpli…es to
Di¤erentiating (36) with respect to yields
where f 1= d = < 1 from (27) because > 1. A higher money growth rate (a) decreases the consumption-capital ratio f d in the DM, (b) increases the consumption-capital ratio f c in the CM, (c) decreases labor supply h in the CM, and (d) decreases economic growth g. E¤ects (a) and (d) hurt welfare, whereas e¤ects (b) and (c) improve welfare. Although it appears that the overall e¤ect of money growth on welfare is ambiguous, we show below that higher money growth is in fact detrimental to social welfare.
Comparing the equilibrium allocations and the …rst-best allocations, we …nd that (a)
c) h < h , and (d) g < g , where the variables with superscript * denote …rst-best allocations. 17 In other words, there is too little consumption in the DM due to the cost of holding money. In the CM, there is too much consumption and too little labor supply due to capital externality. Finally, the equilibrium growth rate is also suboptimally low. Therefore, increasing the money growth rate that forces the equilibrium allocations to deviate further from the …rst-best allocations is detrimental to welfare. In other words, decreasing the money growth rate improves welfare, and the Friedman rule (given by ! 1) is optimal in this model. However, although the Friedman rule is optimal, it does not achieve the …rst-best allocations due to the presence of capital externality. 18 Proposition 3 A higher money growth rate reduces social welfare, and the Friedman rule is optimal but does not achieve the …rst-best allocations due to capital externality.
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model in order to perform a numerical investigation on the e¤ects of in ‡ation on social welfare. We consider two policy objectives (a) price stability (or equivalently, zero in ‡ation) and (b) the Friedman rule. Both of these policy objectives are commonly analyzed in the literature; see for example, Dotsey and Ireland (1996) 
Empirical estimation
To facilitate the subsequent calibration, we …rst provide an empirical estimation of the e¤ects of in ‡ation on economic growth. Early studies by Kormendi and Meguire (1985) , De Gregorio (1993) and Fischer (1993) provide empirical evidence to show that in ‡ation has a direct negative e¤ect on long-run economic growth as well as an indirect negative e¤ect via the reduction of capital investment. Here we use recent cross-country panel data 20 to estimate the following regressions:
where g it denotes the growth rate of real GDP in country i at time t, I it denotes capital investment as a percentage of GDP, and it 1 denotes the in ‡ation rate of consumer price index. 21 X it is a vector of the following control variables: (a) a constant, (b) country …xed e¤ects, (c) year …xed e¤ects, (d) export as a percentage of GDP, and (e) government spending as a percentage of GDP. We consider data of 172 countries from 1981 to 2011. The total e¤ects of in ‡ation on economic growth is @g it =@ it 1 = 2 + 1 ! 1 , where 2 captures the direct e¤ect of it 1 on g it , and 1 ! 1 captures the indirect e¤ect of it 1 on g it via I it . Upon obtaining an estimate of @g it =@ it 1 , we will then include this empirical moment in our calibration in the next subsection. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the data. Table 2 reports the regression results. The estimate of 2 is -0.0130 with a t-statistics of -3.101, whereas the estimate of 1 ! 1 is -0.0043 with a t-statistics of -5.002. 19 In an unpublished appendix (see Appendix E), we provide the derivations of equilibrium allocations under exogenous growth. 20 Data source: The World Bank DataBank. 21 We lag in ‡ation by one period in order to reduce the problem of reverse casuality. 22 This t-statistics is computed using the delta method. y Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***, respectively, denote signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Calibration
We begin by characterizing a benchmark economy, in which each structural parameter is either set to a conventional value or matched to an empirical moment computed using longrun data from 1959 to 2011 in the US economy. In the endogenous growth model, the discount factor is set to 0.952 to match an annual discount rate of 5%. 23 The capital-share parameter is set to 0.3, which implies a labor share = 1 of 0.7. We consider an initial money growth rate of 7.3%, so that the annual in ‡ation rate of consumer price index is 4.0% when the economy grows at an annual growth rate of 3.2%. As for the capital depreciation rate, we calibrate by matching the investment-capital ratio of 0.07. The leisure parameter A is set to 5.042, so that the long-run growth rate is 3.2%. The consumption parameter B is set to 1.588 to match the money-consumption ratio of 0.257 in the US using M1 as the measure of money as is standard in the literature. As for the matching probability , we calibrate it by matching @g=@ = As for the exogenous growth model, we consider a similar set of parameter values. In this case, the exogenous growth model is also able to match the same set of empirical moments. Table 3a summarizes the parameter values. As for equilibrium values of the key variables, we report them in Table 3b . The consumption-capital ratio of 0.335 and the capital-output ratio of 2.467 from the calibration are in line with empirical moments in the US economy. 
Numerical results
Given the above parameter values, we consider the following policy experiments. First, we lower from 0.073 to a value that achieves zero in ‡ation. This value is 0.033 in the endogenous growth model and 0.032 in the exogenous growth model. In this case, the in ‡ation rate decreases from 4.0% to 0% in both models. As for the Friedman rule, we lower from 0.073 to -0.048, so that the nominal interest rate decreases and approaches zero. In Table 4 , we report the results, which are expressed in percent changes of the variables, except for g and U . The changes in g are expressed in percentage point, and the changes in U are expressed in the usual equivalent variations in consumption. In Table 4 , we see that reducing the money growth rate has the following e¤ects. First, it raises the supply of labor h in both models; however, the labor-supply e¤ect is much larger in the endogenous growth model than in the exogenous growth model. Second, it also raises the consumption-capital ratio f d in both models. The larger labor supply h and the higher consumption-capital ratio f d serve to increase economic growth in the endogenous growth model, but they do not increase economic growth in the exogenous growth model.
Comparing f d and h under zero in ‡ation and the Friedman rule, we see that the increases in both f d and h are disproportionately larger under Friedman rule than under zero in ‡ation. From (27) and (30a), we see that both f d and h are decreasing and convex functions in , and this property has the following implications on the growth and welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation. We …nd that the convexity carries over to the growth rate g, which is also a decreasing and convex function in . In Figure 1 , we plot welfare changes against the money growth rate and see that the convexity in g in the endogenous growth model is also re ‡ected in welfare U because the growth e¤ect is numerically the most important component of the welfare e¤ect in the endogenous growth model. Given that the welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation is approximately linear in the exogenous growth model, the di¤erence in the welfare costs of in ‡ation across the two models is increasing in the size of the change in the money growth rate. In the case of zero in ‡ation, we …nd that the welfare gain of 1.589% in the endogenous growth model is almost three times as large as the welfare gain of 0.572% in the exogenous growth model. 25 In the case of Friedman rule, the welfare gain of 7.884% in the endogenous growth model is over four times as large as the welfare gain of 1.790% in the exogenous growth model. The reasons why the endogenous growth model features a much larger welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation than the exogenous growth model are as follows. First, the equilibrium growth rate increases as the money growth rate decreases, whereas the balanced growth rate is constant in the exogenous growth model. 26 Second, Table 4 shows that as a result of a higher money growth rate, the consumptioncapital ratio f c in the CM falls by much more in the exogenous growth model than in the endogenous growth model. Finally, Table 4 also shows that labor supply h increases by much less under exogenous growth than under endogenous growth.
Given that the matching probability is the key parameter in determining the magnitude of the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation, we perform a robustness check by varying the value of while holding other parameter values constant. We report the results for 2 f0:05; 0:2g in Figures 2 and 3 , in which we see a similar pattern as before. In fact, considering a wide range of values of 2 (0; 0:5), we …nd that the endogenous growth model features larger welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation than the exogenous growth model in all cases. Furthermore, we …nd that the welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation is more sensitive to the value of under endogenous growth than under exogenous growth. The money growth rate
The welfare gain
Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the growth and welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation in a search-andmatching monetary endogenous growth model. We …nd that modelling economic growth as an endogenous process ampli…es the welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation. Furthermore, the channel through which in ‡ation a¤ects economic growth in the search-and-matching model is di¤erent The money growth rate
The welfare gain from the traditional CIA model. Therefore, given the relative tractability of recent vintages of the search-and-matching model, it could be a fruitful direction for future research to further revisit the interesting implications of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare in variants of the search model. For example, it would be interesting to consider the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation under di¤erent pricing mechanisms in a search-and-matching monetary endogenous growth model. 27 Finally, we acknowledge that by having a degenerate distribution of money held by households, our numerical results on the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation could be biased upwards; 28 therefore, it would also be interesting to take into account the distributional e¤ect of in ‡ation in future studies.
Appendix C: Dynamic properties of the search model
In this appendix, we show that the economy in the search model always jumps to a unique and locally stable balanced growth path given a stationary sequence of monetary policy (i.e., t = for all t). Combining (17) and (19) and using (10), we can obtain
Here we de…ne f d;t q t =k t as the ratio between consumption and capital in the DM and make use of (5), (17), (20), (25) and (C1) to derive
Combining (3), (5), (21), (23) and (24) and using (10) to yield
In addition, the capital-accumulation equation is k t+1 =k t = y x;t =k t x t =k t + 1 = h t B h
. Applying this equation to (C3) yields
Log-linearizing (C2) and (C4) around the steady-state equilibrium yields the following deterministic system:
where we have used > (1 ) 1. Let 1 and 2 be the two characteristic roots of the dynamic system. The trace and determinant of Jacobian are given by
As indicated in (C6) and (C7), the dynamic system exists two unstable characteristic roots ( 1 = a 11 > 1 and 2 = a 22 > 1). Given h and f d are jump variables, two unstable characteristic roots imply that the economy jumps to a unique and locally stable balanced growth path.
Appendix D: First-best allocations of the search model
In this appendix, we derive the …rst-best allocations of the search model and compare them with the equilibrium allocations. The planner chooses all quantities directly, taking all relevant information into account. Here money is not essential. The planner's problem is
subject to the capital-accumulation equation
From standard dynamic optimization, the optimality conditions for q t and h t are respectively
The intertemporal optimality condition for capital accumulation is
and the envelope condition is
Combining (D5) and (D6), we can derive the …rst-best balanced growth rate g given by
where f c (x=k) and f d (q=k) denote the …rst-best consumption-capital ratios for general goods and special goods respectively. From (D3), we can obtain
As for f c , combining (D7) and (D2) yields
Rewriting (D4) yields
Equations (D7), (D8), (D9) and (D10) determine the …rst-best allocations fg ; f d ; f c ; h g. Comparing (D8) and (27) shows that
where (f d ) 1= = is determined by (D8). Substituting (30) into (29) yield
where f 1= d = is determined by (27) . Comparing (D11) and (D12) shows that f c > f c because f d < f d and < 1. Given f c > f c , (D10) and (30) imply that h < h . Rewriting (D2) yields
Given that h < h and f c > f c , it must be the case that g < g .
Appendix E (not for publication): Exogenous technological progress
In this unpublished appendix, we provide the derivations of equilibrium allocations under exogenous growth. We follow Waller (2011) to assume an exogenous technological progress; in other words, z t in (9) increases according to an exogenous growth rate g z (z t+1 z t ) =z t . Based on (4), (10) and (21), the balanced growth rate of x t can be expressed as
where r = s 1 h from (23) . On the balanced-growth path, variables such as output, consumption, capital and real money balance, grow at the same rate as z t (i.e., g x = g z ).
The variable s k=z denotes the capital-technology ratio and can be determined using the following condition
which uses the capital-accumulation equation k t+1 = y x;t x t + (1 ) k t . As for f d and f c , we use analogous inference as in section 3 to obtain
where R denotes the nominal interest rate and is given by R = (1 + ) = 1 at the steady state. We make use of (E1), (E2) and (E3) to derive
which is positive because (1 + g z ) = > 1 + g z > 1 + g z (1 ) . Using (3) and (24) , equation (E2) can be rearranged as
Combining (E2), (E4) and (E5), the equilibrium allocation of h is
which is also positive. We substitute (E4) and (E6) into (E2) to obtain the equilibrium allocation of s as (1 )] + ( + g z ) 2 =B .
As for social welfare, the lifetime utility of households on the balanced growth path is 
where we have dropped the exogenous growth rate g z . In the rest of this appendix, we consider the …rst-best allocations under exogenous growth and compare them with the equilibrium allocations. The planner's problem is J(k t ) = max qt;xt;ht;k t+1
subject to the capital-accumulation equation k t+1 = z 1 t k t h t x t +(1 )k t . From standard dynamic optimization, the optimality conditions for q t and h t are respectively
Combining (E14) and (E15), we can obtain the balanced growth rate of x t given by
where s (k=z) , f c (x=k) and f d (q=k) denote the …rst-best capital-technology ratio and the …rst-best consumption-capital ratios for general goods and special goods respectively. On the balanced growth path, the growth rate of x t is equal to the growth rate of z t (i.e., g x = g z ). Using (E12), we obtain
In addition, the capital-accumulation equation can be rearranged as
Based on (E16), (E17) and (E18), the …rst-best consumption-capital for general goods can be expressed as
Combining (E13), (E18) and (E19) yields
Substituting (E19) and (E20) into (E18), we obtain .
As for f d , we make use of (E21) and (E17) to obtain
Comparing the …rst-best allocations with equilibrium allocations, we …nd that f d = f d , f c = f c , s = s and h = h if the nominal interest rate R is equal to zero; therefore, the Friedman rule holds in the exogenous growth model.
